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Abstract
We tested the computational feasibility of the proposal that
open-ended cultural evolution was made possible by two cog-
nitive transitions: (1) onset of the capacity to chain thoughts to-
gether, followed by (2) onset of contextual focus (CF): the ca-
pacity to shift between a divergent mode of thought conducive
to ‘breaking out of a rut’ and a convergent mode of thought
conducive to minor modifications. These transitions were sim-
ulated in EVOC, an agent-based model of cultural evolution, in
which the fitness of agents’ actions increases as agents invent
ideas for new actions, and imitate the fittest of their neighbors’
actions. Both mean fitness and diversity of actions across the
society increased with chaining, and even more so with CF, as
hypothesized. CF was only effective when the fitness function
changed, which supports its hypothesized role in generating
and refining ideas.
Keywords: Agent-based model, CF, convergent though, cre-
ativity, cultural evolution, divergent thought, dual process, re-
cursive retrieval, stream of thought.
Introduction
Humans are unique with respect to the ability to generate
accumulative, adaptive cultural evolution, a phenomenon re-
ferred to as the ratchet effect (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner,
1993). Gaining insight into the origins of the capacity for
complex culture is difficult, since all that is left of our prehis-
toric ancestors are bones and artifacts such as stone tools that
resist the passage of time. Although methods for analyzing
these remains are becoming increasingly sophisticated, they
cannot always distinguish amongst competing theories. Thus,
formal models provide valuable reconstructive tools for test-
ing the feasibility of theories concerning the origins of the
cognitive mechanisms that have transformed our planet.
Several cognitive mechanisms have been implicated in
the ability to evolve culture. One is the capacity to chain
thoughts together to generate a sequence of actions or stream
of thought (Donald, 1991). Another is contextual focus (here-
after referred to as CF): the capacity to shift between analytic
and associative modes of thought (Gabora, 2003). Mathemat-
ical models of both have been developed (Gabora & Aerts,
2009; Gabora & Kitto, 2012; Veloz et al., 2011). Incorpo-
rating chaining into a computational model of cultural evolu-
tion increased the fitness and diversity of cultural outputs, as
well as the effectiveness of learning (Gabora & Saberi, 2011).
Incorporating CF into a portrait painting computer program
generated artworks that humans preferred over those gener-
ated without CF (DiPaola & Gabora, 2009). However, the
portrait painting program did not allow investigation of the
effect of CF on the evolution of ideas through cultural inter-
action. The goal of the work presented here was to understand
the relationship between chaining and CF. Specifically, we in-
vestigate the feasibility of the hypothesis that RR is broadly
useful for improving cultural outputs, while CF is specifically
useful for overcoming a new or sudden challenge.
Early Signs of Human Creativity
The minds of our earliest ancestors, Homo habilis, are re-
ferred to as episodic because there is no evidence that their
experience deviated from the present moment of concrete
sensory perceptions (Donald, 1991). They encoded percep-
tions of events in memory, but had little voluntary access to
them without cues. They were therefore unable to voluntarily
shape, modify, or practice skills and actions, and could not
invent or refine complex actions, gestures, or vocalizations.
Homo habilis was eventually replaced by Homo erectus,
which lived between approximately 1.8 and 0.3 million years
ago. This period is considered the beginning of human cul-
tural evolution. Homo erectus exhibited signs of enhanced
intelligence, creativity, and adaptability. They made sophisti-
cated task-specific stone hand axes, had complex stable sea-
sonal home bases, and there is evidence of long-distance
hunting strategies involving large game, and migration out
of Africa (Leakey 1984). It is widely believed that these
early signs of creative culture reflect an underlying transi-
tion in cognitive or social abilities. The cranial capacity of
the Homo erectus brain was approximately 1,000 cc, which
is about 25% larger than that of Homo habilis, and at least
twice as large as that of living great apes, and 75% that of
modern humans (Aiello, 1996 ).
Some have suggested that these abilities are due to the on-
set of a theory of mind (Mithen, 1998) or the capacity to im-
itate (Dugatkin, 2001). However, there is evidence that non-
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human primates also possess theory of mind (Heyes, 1998)
and the capacity to imitate (Dugatkin, 2001), yet their cul-
tural complexity do not compare with humans’. Evolutionary
psychologists have suggested that our unique abilities were
due to the onset of massive modularity (Barkow, Cosmides,
& Tooby, 1992). However, although the mind exhibits an in-
termediate degree of functional and anatomical modularity,
neuroscience has not revealed vast numbers of hardwired, en-
capsulated, task-specific modules; indeed, the brain is more
subject to environmental influence than was previously be-
lieved (Buller, 2005; Byrne, 2000; Wexler, 2006).
Donald (1991) proposed that with the enlarged cranial ca-
pacity of Homo erectus, the human mind underwent a transi-
tion characterized by a shift from an episodic to a mimetic
mode of cognitive functioning, made possible by onset of
the capacity to voluntarily retrieve memories independent of
environmental cues and chain them into sequences. Donald
refers to the cognitive architecture underlying this capacity as
a self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop. It enabled infor-
mation to be processed recursively, and from different per-
spectives. Voluntary access to memories made it possible to
act out1 events that occurred in the past or that might occur in
the future. Thus not only could the mimetic mind temporarily
escape the here and now, but by miming or gesture it could
communicate similar escapes to other minds. The capacity to
mime thus brought forth what is referred to as a mimetic form
of cognition, and allowed for the onset of culture. The self-
triggered recall and rehearsal loop also enabled our ancestors
to engage in a stream of thought, in which one thought or idea
evokes another, and so forth recursively. In this way, attention
can be directed away from the external world toward one’s
internal model of it. Finally, self-triggered recall allowed for
voluntary rehearsal and refinement of actions, enabling sys-
tematic evaluation and improvement of skills and motor acts.
An Explosion of Creative Cultural Change
The European archaeological record indicates that an un-
paralleled cultural transition occurred between 60,000 and
30,000 years ago, at the onset of the Upper Paleolithic. Con-
sidering it ”evidence of the modern human mind at work,”
Leakey (1984:93-94) describes this period as ”unlike previ-
ous eras, when stasis dominated, ... [with] change being
measured in millennia rather than hundreds of millennia.”
Similarly, Mithen (1998) refers to the Upper Paleaolithic as
the ‘big bang’ of human culture, exhibiting more innovation
than in the previous six million years of human evolution. It
marks the beginnings of traits considered diagnostic of be-
havioral modernity, including a more organized, strategic,
season-specific style of hunting involving specific animals at
specific sites, elaborate burial sites indicative of ritual and re-
ligion, evidence of dance, magic, and totemism, colonization
of Australia, and replacement of Levallois tool technology by
blade cores in the Near East. In Europe, complex hearths and
many forms of art appeared, including cave paintings of ani-
1The term mimetic is derived from “mime,” which means “to act
out.”
mals, decorated tools and pottery, bone and antler tools with
engraved designs, ivory statues of animals and sea shells, and
personal decoration such as beads, pendants, and perforated
animal teeth, many of which may have indicated social status.
Whether this period was a genuine revolution culminat-
ing in behavioral modernity is hotly debated because claims
to this effect are based on the European Palaeolithic record,
and largely exclude the African record (McBrearty & Brooks,
2000). However the dominant view is that modern behavior
appeared in Africa between 40,000 and 50,000 years ago, and
spread, resulting in displacement of the Neanderthals in Eu-
rope (Klein, 1999). From this point on there was only one
hominid species: modern Homo sapien, and despite a lack
of overall increase in cranial capacity, their prefrontal cortex,
and more particularly the orbitofrontal region, increased sig-
nificantly in size (Dunbar, 1993). in what was most likely a
time of major neural reorganization (Klein, 1999). Given that
the Middle/Upper Palaeolithic was a period of unprecedented
creativity, what kind of cognitive processes were involved?
It is widely believed that a divergent or associative mode
of thought predominates during idea generation, while a con-
vergent or analytic mode predominates during the refine-
ment, implementation, and testing of an idea (Finke, Ward,
& Smith, 1992). It has been proposed that the Paleolithic
transition reflects fine-tuning of the biochemical mechanisms
underlying the capacity to subconsciously shift between these
modes, depending on the situation, by varying the specificity
of the activated cognitive receptive field (Gabora, 2003; Gab-
ora & Kaufman, 2010). This is referred to as contextual fo-
cus2 (CF) because it requires the ability to focus or defocus
attention in response to the context or situation one is in. De-
focused attention, by diffusely activating a broad region of
memory, is conducive to divergent thought; it enables obscure
(but potentially relevant) aspects of the situation to come into
play. Focused attention is conducive to convergent thought;
memory activation is constrained enough to hone in and per-
form logical mental operations on the most clearly relevant
aspects.
The Computational Model
We reviewed the evidence for two hypotheses: (1) the earli-
est signs of culture were due to the onset of the capacity to
chain representations together, and (2) the cultural explosion
of the Middle-Upper Paleolithic was due to the onset of CF.
We investigated these hypotheses using an agent-based model
of cultural evolution referred to as “EVOlution of Culture”,
abbreviated EVOC. EVOC uses neural network based agents
that (1) invent new ideas, (2) imitate actions implemented by
neighbors, (3) evaluate ideas, and (4) implement successful
ideas as actions. EVOC is an elaboration of Meme and Varia-
tions, or MAV (Gabora, 1995), the earliest computer program
to our knowledge to model not just cultural transmission but
2In neural net terms, CF amounts to the capacity to sponta-
neously and subconsciously vary the shape of the activation func-
tion, flat for divergent thought and spiky for analytical
cumulative, adaptive, cultural evolution.3 It was inspired by
the genetic algorithm, a search technique that finds solutions
to complex problems by generating a ‘population’ of candi-
date solutions through processes akin to mutation, selecting
the best, and repeating until a satisfactory solution is found
(Holland, 1975). The goal behind MAV, and also behind
EVOC, was to distil the underlying logic of not biological
evolution but cultural evolution. Agents do not evolve in a bi-
ological sense–they neither die nor have offspring–but do in a
cultural sense, by adaptively modifying each others’ ideas for
actions. We summarize the architecture of EVOC in sufficient
detail to explain our results; for details we refer the reader to
previous publications (e.g., Gabora, 1995; Gabora & Saberi,
2011; Leijnen & Gabora, 2009).
Agents
Agents consist of (1) a neural network, which encodes ideas
for actions and detects trends in what constitutes a fit action,
(2) a ‘perceptual system’, which carries out the evaluation
and imitation of neighbours’ actions, and (3) a body, consist-
ing of six body parts which implement actions. The neural
network is composed of six input nodes and six correspond-
ing output nodes that represent concepts of body parts (LEFT
ARM, RIGHT ARM, LEFT LEG, RIGHT LEG, HEAD, and
HIPS), as well as hidden nodes that represent more abstract
concepts (LEFT, RIGHT, ARM, LEG, SYMMETRY, OPPO-
SITE, and MOVEMENT). Input nodes and output nodes are
connected to hidden nodes of which they are instances (e.g.,
LEFT ARM is connected to LEFT.) Activation of any input
node activates the MOVEMENT node. Same-direction acti-
vation of symmetrical input nodes (e.g., upward motion–of
both arms) activates the SYMMETRY node.
Invention
An idea for a new action is a pattern consisting of six elements
that dictate the placement of the six body parts. Agents gener-
ate new actions by modifying their initial action or an action
that has been invented previously or acquired through imita-
tion. During invention, the pattern of activation on the output
nodes is fed back to the input nodes, and invention is biased
according to the activations of the SYMMETRY and MOVE-
MENT hidden nodes. (Were this not the case there would
be no benefit to using a neural network.) To invent a new
idea, for each node of the idea currently represented on the
input layer of the neural network, the agent makes a proba-
bilistic decision as to whether the position of that body part
will change, and if it does, the direction of change is stochas-
tically biased according to the learning rate. If the new idea
has a higher fitness than the currently implemented idea, the
agent learns and implements the action specified by that idea.
Imitation
The process of finding a neighbour to imitate works through
a form of lazy (non-greedy) search. The imitating agent ran-
3The approach can thus be contrasted with computer models of
how individual learning affects biological evolution (e.g., Higgs,
2000; Hinton & Nowlan, 1987; Hutchins & Hazelhurst, 1991).
Table 1: Definition table.
Term Definition Example
Body
Part
Component of agent
other than neural net-
work.
Left Arm (LA)
Sub-
action
Set of six components
that indicates position of
6 body parts. Each can be
in a neutral (0), up (1), or
down (-1) position.
HD:0, LA:1,
RA:-1, LL:1,
RL:0, HP:-1;
This sub-action
is abbreviated
01-110-1
Action One or more sequential
sub-actions.
01001-1, -10-1-
111
Template Abstract or prototypical
format for a sub-action.
Position of a body part
can be unspecified (*).
HD:0, LA:*,
RA:1, LL:*,
RL:1, HP:-1
domly scans its neighbours, and adopts the first action that is
fitter than the action it is currently implementing. If it does
not find a neighbour that is executing a fitter action than its
own current action, it continues to execute the current action.
Evaluation: The Fitness Function
Fitness was evaluated using an adaptation of the Royal Roads
fitness function (Forrest & Mitchell, 1993). Midway through
a run the fitness function was changed to test the effectiveness
of chaining and CF for adapting to a sudden change in the task
constraints or the environment. Definitions of terms used to
accomplish this are provided in Table One.
The first fitness function is determined by 45 templates, six
of which are shown in Table Two. The second (not shown) is
constructed analogously, with different sub-actions. The tem-
plates can be thought of as defining the cultural significance
of types of sub-actions (such as dance steps). Each template
T i consists of six components, one for each body part (i.e.,
T i = t ij; j = 1..6). Each body part can be in a neutral position
(0) , up (1), down (-1), or an unspecified position (*). For
example, in template T i = ∗,1,−1,∗,∗,0, the left arm is up
(LA:1), the right arm is down (RA:-1), the hips are in the neu-
tral position (HP:0), and the positions of other body parts is
unspecified (HD:*, LL:*, and RL:*). The templates provide
constraints, as well as flexibility with respect to what consti-
tutes a fit action. For example, in an optimally fit action, the
head must be in the neutral position (in T 1 the first component
is 0) but the positions of other body parts can vary). The opti-
mal sub-actions are {0,1,−1,1,−1,1}, {0,1,−1,1,−1,−1},
{0,−1,1,−1,1,1}, and {0,−1,1,−1,1,−1}.
Assume that D is a sub-action (i.e., D= d j; j= 1..6) and T i
is the ith template (i.e., T i = t ij; j = 1..6). Thus, d j represents
the position of the jth body part and the value of d j can be
either 0 (neutral), 1 (up), or -1 (down). Likewise, the value of
t ij can be 0, 1, -1, or * (unspecified). Accordingly, the fitness
of sub-action D is obtained as per Eq. 1.
Table 2: Partial set of the templates used in the first fitness
function. (The rest are omitted due to lack of space.)
T 1 = {0,∗,∗,∗,∗,∗} T 24 = {1,∗,∗,1,1,∗}
T 2 = {∗,0,∗,∗,∗,∗} T 25 = {1,∗,1,∗,1,∗}
T 3 = {∗,∗,0,∗,∗,∗} T 26 = {1,∗,1,1,∗,∗}
F(D) =
19
∑
i=1
Φ(T i,D)×Ω(T i) (1)
As shown in Eq. 1, fitness is a function of template weight
(Φ(T i,D)) and template order (Ω(T i)).
Template Weight Φ(T i,D) is a function that determines
the weight of sub-action D by comparing it with template T i.
This weight is set to one if each component of the sub-action
(i.e., d j; j = 1..6) either matches the corresponding compo-
nent of the template (i.e., t ij; j = 1..6) or if the corresponding
components of the template is unspecified (i.e., t ij = ∗):
Φ(T i,D) =
{
1 i f ∀t ij ∈ T i : t ij = d j or ∗
0 otherwise
(2)
Template Order Ω(T i) computes the order of the template
T i by counting the number of components that have a speci-
fied value (i.e., t ij 6= ∗).
Ω(T i) =
6
∑
j=1,t ij 6=∗
t ij (3)
The fitness functions are difficult to solve because they are
rugged; is to have multiple milestones, or fitness peaks, that
agents must achieve before reaching the plateau. For exam-
ple, consider the fitness function given in Table 2. The ac-
tion 0,0,0,0,0,0 has a fitness of 6. An agent may move on
from this action to find an actions that fits the third order
templates with a fitness of 31, e.g., F(D) : {1,1,1,1,1,0} =
3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3+1 = 31.
Learning
Invention makes use of the ability to learn, and respond adap-
tively to trends. Knowledge acquired through the evaluation
of actions is translated into educated guesses about how to
invent fit actions. For example, an agent may learn that sym-
metrical movement tends to be either beneficial or detrimen-
tal, and bias the generation of new actions accordingly.
A Typical Run
Fitness and diversity of actions are initially low because all
agents are initially immobile, implementing the same action,
with all body parts in the neutral position. Soon some agent
invents an action that has a higher fitness than immobility,
and this action gets imitated, so fitness increases. Fitness in-
creases further as other ideas get invented, assessed, imple-
mented as actions, and spread through imitation. The diver-
sity of actions increases due to the proliferation of new ideas,
and then decreases as agents hone in on the fittest actions.
Thus, over successive rounds of invention and imitation, the
agents’ actions improve. EVOC thereby models how “de-
scent with modification” occurs in a purely cultural context.
Method
Modeling Chaining
The chaining algorithm is illustrated schematically in Figure
1b. Chaining gives agents the opportunity to execute multi-
step actions. The agent can keep adding a new sub-action
to its current action so long as the most recently-added sub-
action is both novel and successful. A sub-action D is consid-
ered novel if at least one of its components is different from
that of the previous sub-action. It is considered successful if
there exists a template T i such that Φ(T i,D) is one.
success f ul(D) =
{
true i f ∃ T i : Φ(T i,D) = 1
f alse otherwise (4)
The fitness of an action consisting of more than one sub-
action is obtained by adding the number of sub-actions to the
fitness of the last sub-action in the sequence. For example, if
the last sub-action of an action is D = [0,1,−1,1,−1,1] and
the number of sub-actions is seven, the fitness of the action is
F(D)+7 = 14+7 = 21. Thus where c is ‘with chaining’, w
is ‘without chaining’, n is the number of chained sub-actions,
the fitness of a chained action, Fc, is calculated as follows:
Fc = Fw+n (5)
An agent can execute an arbitrarily long action so long as
it continues to invent successful new sub-actions. In general,
the more sub-actions the fitter the action. This is admittedly a
simple algorithm of simulating the capacity for chaining, but
we were not interested in the impact of this action per se. The
goal here was simply to test hypotheses about how chaining
at the individual level affects dynamics at the societal level,
by providing agents with a means of implementing multistep
actions such that the optimal way of going about one step
depends on how one went about the previous step.
Modeling Contextual Focus
The CF algorithm is illustrated schematically in Figure 1c. In
the convergent mode, the current action is only slightly modi-
fied to create a new action. In the divergent mode, the current
action is substantial modified to create a new action. An agent
switches between these modes by modifying its rate of cre-
ative change (RCC). If the fitness of its current action is low
relative to previous actions, RCC increases, causing the agent
to shift to a more divergent processing mode conducive to
large leaps through the space of possibilities. If action fitness
is high relative to that of previous actions, RCC decreases,
and the agent shifts to a more convergent mode conducive to
minor adjustments. With CF turned off, RCC stays constant
throughout the run at 1/6 (i.e., a new action involves change
to one of the six body parts). The equation to modify RCC is
shown in Eq. 6 where a is a negative value. Since at the start
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of (a) neither chaining nor
CF, (b) chaining only, and (c) both. Chaining operates within
a generation whereas CF operates between generations.
of a run previous fitness is undefined, RCC in this case is a
function of the current fitness as per Eq. 7, where 0 < b < 1.
∆RCC = a(Fnew−Fold) (6)
RCCinitial = bFcurrent (7)
In the results shown here a and b were initialized to -0.005
and 0.8 respectively.
Results
The results of introducing chaining and CF on the mean fit-
ness and diversity (total number of different actions) of ac-
tions across all agents in the society are shown in Figures
2 and 3 respectively. All graphs show means of 500 runs.
Chaining and CF both significantly increased mean fitness of
actions. Without chaining, mean fitness quickly reached a
plateau; with chaining it could increase indefinitely. While
chaining increased mean fitness throughout the run, CF only
increased mean fitness following initial exposure to a new fit-
ness function, i.e., at the beginning of the run, and when the
second fitness function was introduced at iteration 50.
Chaining also significantly increased the diversity of ac-
tions. Although inspection reveals that there is always con-
vergence on optimal actions, without chained actions, this set
is a static (thus mean fitness plateaus) whereas with chained
actions the set of optimal actions changes, as increasingly fit
actions continue to be found. When agents were first exposed
to a fitness function, CF increased both the rate at which new
possibilities were generated, and the rate of convergence on
Figure 2: Mean fitness of cultural outputs across the society
with both chaining and CF (red line), chaining only (dashed
blue line), and neither chaining nor CF (dotted green line).
the fittest of these, although this effect is more pronounced
for the first fitness function than the second. As with fitness,
CF exerted no noticeable effect on diversity once the agents
had fit actions.
Figure 3: Diversity of cultural outputs across the society
with both chaining and CF (red line), chaining only (dashed
blue line), and neither chaining nor CF (dotted green line).
Discussion
This paper provides valuable insights into the mechanisms
underlying the uniquely human capacity for collectively gen-
erated, open-ended, adaptive cultural evolution. Our results
suggest that once humans became able to sequence thoughts
together to generate increasingly complex and refined cul-
tural outputs, they would have found themselves at a signif-
icant adaptive advantage. Similarly, our results suggest that
once humans became able to employ an exploratory, diver-
gent processing mode when stuck, followed by a shift to a
more constrained convergent processing mode to fine-tune
their cultural outputs, they would have been capable of gen-
erating significantly more valuable cultural outputs. We sug-
gest that a mechanism akin to CF is what makes possible the
cumulative creativity exhibited by successful computational
models of language evolution (e.g., Kirby, 2001). A poten-
tial downfall of processing in a divergent mode is that since
effort is devoted to the re-processing of previously learned
material, less effort may be devoted to being on the lookout
for danger and simply carrying out practical tasks. Since di-
vergent thought carries a high cognitive load, it would not
have been useful to think divergently until there was a means
to shift back to a convergent mode. Although these results
do not prove that onset of the capacity to chain thoughts to-
gether into sequences, and to shift between divergent modes
of thought through CF, are responsible for our cultural com-
plexity, it shows that they provide a computationally feasible
explanation. We know of no other cognitive mechanisms im-
plicated in the evolution of complex culture for which open-
ended, adaptive cultural change has been demonstrated.
Both chaining and CF were implemented in a simple man-
ner. Future investigations will focus on developing more real-
istic implementations of chaining and CF. Chaining will use
associative recall to reconsider an item from multiple poten-
tially relevant ‘perspectives’, and the divergent mode of CF
will use a sophisticated mathematical model of concepts to
facilitate the generation of new concept combinations.
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